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Abstract: The OSGi framework is a Java-based, centralized, component ori-
ented platform. It is being widely adopted as an execution environment for the
development of extensible applications. However, current Java Virtual Machines
are unable to isolate components from each other. For instance, a malicious
component can freeze the complete platform by allocating too much memory or
alter the behavior of other components by modifying shared variables.
This paper presents I-JVM, a Java Virtual Machine that provides a lightweight
approach to isolation while preserving compatibility with legacy OSGi applica-
tions. Our evaluation of I-JVM shows that it solves the 8 known OSGi vul-
nerabilities that are due to the Java Virtual Machine. Overall, the overhead of
I-JVM compared to the JVM on which it is based is below 20%.
Key-words: Java, Isolation, Thread Migration, Resource Accounting, OSGi
I-JVM: une machine virtuelle Java pour
l’isolation de composants dans OSGi
Résumé : OSGi est une plateforme orientée service implémentée en Java
qui est de plus en plus utilisée pour le développement d’applications extensi-
bles. Cependant, les machines virtuelles Java existantes ne sont pas capables
d’isoler des composants entre eux. Par exemple, un composant malicieux peut
bloquer l’exécution de la plateforme en allouant trop de mémoire ou modifier le
comportement d’autres composants en modifiant des variables globales.
Nous présentons I-JVM, une machine virtuelle Java qui offre une isolation
légère entre composants tout en préservant la compatibilité avec les applications
OSGi existantes. I-JVM résoud les 8 vulnérabilités connues sur la plateforme
OSGi liées à la machine virtuelle, et ne diminue que de 20% les performances
des applications en comparaison avec la machine virtuelle sur laquelle elle est
implémentée.
Mots-clés : Java, Isolation, Migration de threads, Comptage de ressources,
OSGi
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1 Introduction
The OSGi framework [24] is a Java-based component platform which is being
widely adopted as an execution environment for the development of extensible
applications, such as Eclipse [2] or Java Enterprise Servers [3]. Extensibility
in the OSGi platform is provided through a deployment unit called a bundle
which groups together a set of components that are loaded through a specific
Java class loader. The OSGi platform is popular because it provides modu-
larity while still providing efficient communication through direct method calls
between components.
Initially, the OSGi platform was designed for environments where all bundles
trust each other. Nowadays, it is also promoted for systems such as next gen-
eration Internet home gateways where third party services can be downloaded
dynamically [28]. However, the OSGi platform cannot protect a bundle against
another malicious or buggy bundle. First, java.lang.Class objects, strings
and static variables are shared in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The corrup-
tion of any one of these entities by a malicious or buggy bundle will impact all
bundles. Second, a thread can freeze the JVM and deny service by exhausting
memory or monopolizing the CPU. Third, it may be impossible to stop a bundle
denying service, which makes a shut down of the entire platform the only solu-
tion. Not surprisingly, a recent work has identified 25 different vulnerabilities
in current implementations of the Java/OSGi platform that may either lead to
a violation of data integrity or a freeze of the platform [27]. While 17 of these
vulnerabilities are due to a weak implementation of the OSGi framework itself
and can be solved by adding suitable security checks, the remaining 8 originate
in isolation issues and need to be solved at the JVM level.
Several approaches to providing isolation in a single JVM, through Isolates
(or Java processes) have been recently introduced [5, 10, 16]. All of these so-
lutions rely on duplicating the java.lang.Class objects, separating strings
and static variables between isolates, and confining a thread to a single iso-
late. As a consequence, a communication between two isolates must be done
using an RPC-like mechanism, which involves parameter copying and in some
cases thread synchronization. Since the OSGi platform uses communication
between bundles heavily, using RPCs would induce a non negligible overhead
on the whole system performance.1 Additionally, copying parameters implies
modifying legacy bundles either at the source or bytecode level [31], that could
compromise compatibility with legacy bundles.
This paper presents I-JVM, a Java Virtual Machine with lightweight iso-
lates that is specifically designed to support the needs of the OSGi platform
by associating each bundle with a separate isolate. The key contribution of I-
JVM is to permit thread migration between isolates in order to keep the cost of
an inter-isolate method call low. This enables complete bytecode compatibility
with legacy OSGi bundles by avoiding the need to rewrite inter-bundle method
calls. The main features of I-JVM are: Memory isolation. As shown by the Multi-Tasking Virtual Machine (MVM)
[10], making java.lang.Class objects, strings and static variables pri-
1Despite using a highly optimized virtual machine, the developers of Singularity [13] report
that a simple local remote procedure call through a shared heap takes about 2500 cycles while
a direct call takes only about 10 cycles.
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vate to an isolate is sufficient to ensure memory isolation in a single JVM.
Therefore, an isolate cannot access an object from another isolate unless
a reference is given explicitly through method invocation. Resource accounting. I-JVM keeps track of the current isolate in which a
thread is running. This allows recording the amount of memory and CPU
time spent within a isolate. These statistics enable an administrator to
detect denial of service attacks from malicious bundles. Termination of isolates. When an isolate terminates, its classes should not
be invoked anymore. In case a thread returns back to the terminating iso-
late, I-JVM modifies the stack so that an exception is raised and trapped
at a lower stack level. All the objects referenced by the terminating iso-
late are reclaimed by the garbage collector, with the exception of objects
shared with other bundles.
I-JVM has been developed by modifying the LadyVM Java Virtual Machine
[15], a JVM specifically designed for easing experiments in Java. We have used
I-JVM to run two legacy OSGi platforms: Felix [1] of the Apache Community
and Equinox [2] of the Eclipse Project.
Overall the results of this study are: I-JVM solves the OSGi JVM-related weaknesses identified in [27]. We
present 8 attacks that cover these weaknesses. I-JVM has a 16% overhead on inter-bundle calls. This is an order of
magnitude better than the cost of an RPC call between two processes.
Overall, the I-JVM slowdown is between 1% and 20% on a representative
suite of macrobenchmarks. I-JVM requires the addition of only 650 lines of code to LadyVM. Im-
plementing I-JVM features in a legacy JVM should not be much more
complex.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the vul-
nerabilities of the OSGi platform. Section 3 explains and discusses the design
and implementation of I-JVM. Section 4 provides performance measurements of
I-JVM, and evaluates its robustness against denial of service attacks. Section 5
describes related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Vulnerabilities of OSGi
Vulnerabilities in OSGi have been identified at three sources [27]: (i) at the
underlying operating system level, (ii) at the OSGi platform level and (iii) at the
JVM level. The first kind of vulnerability is due to the possibility of running
native code either inside the JVM process or as a separate process. These
vulnerabilities are enabled by JNI or the Runtime.exec Java call. The second
kind of vulnerability is related to weaknesses in the OSGi run-time and can
be solved by adding security checks in the OSGi implementation [27]. In this
paper, we attempt to solve the third kind of vulnerability which targets the
JVM platform.
INRIA
I-JVM: a Java Virtual Machine for Component Isolation in OSGi 5
JVM vulnerabilities can themselves be subdivided into three categories: (i)
lack of isolation, (ii) lack of resource accounting, (iii) failure to terminate a
bundle. In the rest of this section, we present a suite of 8 attacks that cover
the previously reported JVM vulnerabilities in [26, 27]. Our experiments in
Section 4 show that all attacks may corrupt, freeze or abort unprotected OSGi
platforms.
Lack of isolation. As mentioned previously, java.lang.Class objects, strings
and static variables are shared in the JVM by all bundles. A malicious bundle
can alter static variables or lock shared objects, and therefore interfere with the
execution of other bundles. We consider two representative attacks: A1 - Modification of a static variable: All bundles share static variables.
Therefore a bundle can modify a public non-final static variable defined by
either other bundles, the OSGi platform or the core Java System Library.
For example, a malicious bundle can set a shared variable to null, thus
prevent the correct execution of other bundles. Bundles can discover static
variables from other bundles either at compilation, or at runtime with the
reflection API of Java. A2 - Synchronized method or synchronized call block: a bundle can lock
shared strings, java.lang.Class objects or static variables, which can even-
tually freeze the system.
Lack of resource accounting. JVMs implement a bundle by using a specific
class loader. However, JVMs do not perform resource accounting on a per class
loader basis. In case of the over-use of resources, it is impossible to identify the
faulty bundle and stop execution of its code. Resource accounting would help
detecting the following five denial of service attacks: A3 - Memory exhaustion: a malicious bundle consumes most of the mem-
ory by holding references to many or large objects. This leads to an
OutOfMemoryError for other bundles. A4 - Standalone infinite loop: a malicious bundle consumes all CPU re-
sources by entering an infinite loop. A5 - Excessive object creation: a malicious bundle repetitively allocates
objects without referencing them, thus triggering garbage collection and
object finalization, which monopolize the CPU. A6 - Excessive thread creation: a malicious bundle crashes the platform
by exceeding the number of threads supported. A7 - Hanging thread: a malicious bundle blocks when being called, thus
never returning to the caller.
Bundle termination. In some situations, the JVM is unable to unload a
bundle and deallocate all its allocated objects. First, other bundles may continue
to reference the bundle, thus preventing the JVM from unloading the bundle
classes, because a call to methods defined by the classes of the bundle can still
occur. Second, if the OSGi runtime recognizes a bundle as misbehaving and
wants to stop its execution, methods of the bundle may be executing or be in
the call stack of running threads.
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even if the OSGi platform tries to unload it.
3 I-JVM Design and Implementation
The design goal of I-JVM is to provide bundle isolation while preserving the
communication model of the OSGi platform, which relies on direct method
calls. An OSGi application is composed of a set of dynamically loaded bundles
and of the OSGi runtime itself. To implement isolation, each bundle is executed
within a separate isolate. Additionally, the OSGi runtime runs in a specific
isolate, Isolate0, which has higher rights than standard bundles.
I-JVM permits explicit object sharing between isolates by passing an ob-
ject reference in an inter-isolate method call. The key point of I-JVM is to
provide thread migration between isolates in a single address space, which is a
prerequisite for object sharing. Different isolates execute therefore on the same
execution stack, which impacts isolation, resource accounting and termination.
In this Section, we present I-JVM in detail. We focus on the main issues: iso-
lation, resource accounting and termination of isolates. Then, we describe how
to run the OSGi platform using I-JVM. Finally, we report the implementation
of I-JVM in LadyVM [15].
3.1 Isolation and Thread Migration
I-JVM runs isolates in the same address space. Isolates provide a lightweight
protection mechanism integrated in the JVM, so that the classes running in one
isolate cannot crash classes running in another independent isolate. In I-JVM,
an isolate is built from a class loader, so its scope is the classes loaded by the
class loader. There is a specific isolate, Isolate0, which has higher rights on the
platform than standard isolates. These rights are the permissions to start a new
isolate, to terminate an isolate and to shut down the entire Java platform. The
first Java class loader created becomes Isolate0. The subsequence class loaders
are standard isolates.
An inter-isolate method call induces a thread migration. Each thread pos-
sesses a reference to the isolate in which it is currently running. When a thread
calls a method in another isolate, I-JVM sets the thread’s isolate reference to
the called isolate. When the thread leaves the callee, I-JVM sets the reference
back to the caller’s isolate. When an isolate calls a method in the same isolate
or in the core Java System Library, the isolate reference is not changed. Classes
from the Java System Library are not executed in a special isolate but in the
isolate that called it.
To implement isolates, the main change from the JVM specification is to have
a per-isolate private copy of static variables, strings and java.lang.Class objects.
This is sufficient to ensure that an isolate does not have access to the internal
state of another isolate since: (i) an isolate cannot construct a foreign reference
thanks to the type safety of the Java bytecode; (ii) an isolate cannot access an
isolate private field or method thanks to the scope of fields and methods in the
Java bytecode.
Isolation of static variables is done by associating a task class mirror [10]
per class. The task class mirror of a class contains the initialization state of
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the class, the static variables and the associated java.lang.Class object. I-JVM
uses the current isolate reference of the thread as an index into the array of task
class mirrors of a class. Accessing a static variable requires fetching the execu-
tion environment, loading the isolate reference from the execution environment,
loading the task class mirror and finally loading the static variable. Compared
to simply loading a static variable, the task class mirror approach requires two
additional loads. An isolate also always has to check the initialization state
of a class before accessing one of its static variable or before calling a static
method. Like in MVM, the just in time compiler cannot remove all of the class
initialization checks, because the code compiled must be reentrant [10].
3.2 Resource Accounting
I-JVM monitors the execution of isolates. Resources consumed in the code of
an isolate are charged to the isolate. Resources consumed in a method of the
Java System Library are charged to the caller of the method. I-JVM counts the
CPU time consumed, the objects allocated, the number of threads created, the
number of connections used, the number of bytes read or written through I/O
connections, and the number of garbage collection activations.
Memory and connections: When an isolate allocates an object, I-JVM
charges the object to the isolate. If the object is a connection (FileDescriptor
or Socket), the connection is also charged to the creator. If the isolate gives this
object to another isolate through an inter-isolate call (i.e. the object becomes
shared), I-JVM does not immediately update the memory usage of the callee.
An update would require call barriers and write barriers, which would drasti-
cally degrade performance. We also do not divide the resource consumption of
shared objects or connections between isolates because doing so would require
maintaining a list of isolates that use the shared object, thus would introduce a
new list traversal for all objects during garbage collection.
To update the amount of memory held by an isolate, I-JVM relies on the
Garbage Collector (GC). Besides collecting unreferenced objects, the GC runs
the following algorithm for memory and connection accounting:
1. The amount of memory and connections used per isolate is reinitialized
to zero.
2. For each isolate, the GC adds its list of strings, static objects and java.-
lang.Class objects to its root objects.
3. For each thread, the GC inspects the execution frames on their stack.
For an execution frame, the GC knows the Java method that created the
frame, hence its isolate. The GC adds therefore all the object referenced
by the frame to the isolate in which the frame is executed. It does not
inspect frames from the core Java System Libraries methods because the
objects referenced in the frame are also referenced by the isolate that
called the library.
4. The GC traces the roots of isolates (i.e., the objects identified in steps 2.
and 3.). An object is charged to the first isolate that references it.
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While unprecise, we think the approach is sufficient because it gives a rough
estimation of memory consumption per bundle in the presence of object sharing.
We leave as future work improvements on the precision of memory accounting.
Threads: Threads are created within an isolate. I-JVM counts the number
of threads an isolate creates. Note that threads are charged to their creator,
but may execute code from any isolate via inter-bundle calls.
I/O reads and writes: Any read or write to a connection is instrumented
in order to charge the isolate performing the operation. The approach is similar
to JRes’ accounting of network resources [11]: there are few classes that perform
read and writes on connections, and instrumenting them is straightforward.
CPU time: For CPU accounting, we have studied two solutions. The first
one is to insert per-isolate time updates during an inter-isolate call. This induces
a significant performance penalty because it requires: (i) two system calls to
fetch the current time, one when entering and one when leaving the isolate and
(ii) a lock acquisition to update the CPU time when leaving the call. Therefore,
we chose a second solution in which I-JVM counts the CPU time spent in isolates
by regularly sampling the value of the isolate reference of a running thread.
Garbage collection: I-JVM uses a single GC for all isolates. To detect
attacks on garbage collection activations, I-JVM counts the number of times an
isolate triggers the GC.
3.3 Isolate Termination
There are two main problems when terminating an isolate. First, threads mi-
grate between isolates; therefore I-JVM cannot just kill the threads created by
the isolate. Also, a thread created by another isolate may be executing code
from the terminating isolate. Second, shared objects referenced by other isolates
cannot be released.
When terminating an isolate, I-JVM stops the execution of all threads by
sending them a signal. The handler of the signal is defined at startup and
cannot be modified by isolates, thanks to the Java language. Upon receiving
the signal, a thread inspects and modifies its stack as follows. For each frame,
if it is called from a frame that belongs to the terminating isolate, the thread
changes the return pointer to throw a StoppedIsolateException exception.
The terminating isolate cannot catch this exception: even if the isolate tries to
catch it in the Java code, I-JVM will ignore it. I-JVM also takes a special action
for the last frame: If it belongs to the Java System Library, I-JVM sets the interrupted flag
of the thread so that I/O or sleep calls are interrupted. This approach is
similar to protection domain termination in Spring [17]. If it belongs to the terminating isolate, the thread throws the Stopped-
IsolateException.
Moreover, code from the terminating isolate should not be called anymore,
so that the isolate does not attempt to deny service once again. I-JVM prevents
execution of the isolate by (i) not JIT compiling the methods not JITed yet and
(ii) modifying the code of the already compiled methods. At the beginning of
each of these methods, I-JVM inserts a branch to a function that throws the
StoppedIsolateException.
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An isolate is only removed from memory when there is no remaining object
whose class is defined by the isolate.
3.4 Running OSGi on I-JVM
An OSGi application is made of a set of dynamically loaded bundles and the
OSGi runtime itself. To implement protection, each bundle is executed within
a separate isolate; the OSGi runtime runs in the Isolate0.
Isolate0 is associated with the applicative class loader that loads the main
function of the OSGi framework. When OSGi loads a new bundle, it allocates
a new class loader. I-JVM associates therefore a standard isolate to this class
loader. This makes it possible to run a legacy OSGi runtime on I-JVM with-
out any modification. The start method of a bundle receives an object that
represents OSGi. This object is the first shared object between bundles. It is
used in OSGi to register object references in a name service and to find foreign
references. Hence, at startup, a bundle can only access foreign objects in this
name service.
We additionaly define a few rules that an OSGi runtime must follow:
1. It should create a new thread when calling the start and stop methods of a
bundle, in order to prevent a malicious bundle from freezing the OSGi runtime.
2. It must use Java permissions to deny access of privileged resources to
bundles. For example, the JVM allows Java applications to run non-Java code
through the use of the JNI interface or the Runtime.exec call. This gives a bundle
the possibility to run unverified code that could destroy the OSGi platform. A
second example is the System.exit method which shuts down the JVM.
3. It should send a StoppedBundleEvent to all bundles when a bundle is
being killed. A bundle can then take any action it desires: it can ignore the
event or may release the references it had on the terminating bundle objects.
If the bundle does not release the references, I-JVM may charge the objects to
the bundle. The key point is that resources from the terminating bundle will
not be released until all bundles release their references to them.
We also define one rule for writing bundles:
1. Bundles should be prepared to catch any kind of exceptions when calling
other bundle methods. Like any regular JVM, I-JVM uses exceptions to signal
an error during the execution of an isolate. Such errors include regular errors
such as erroneous class files or null pointer exceptions, but also I-JVM specific
errors when the isolate is being killed.
3.5 I-JVM Implementation
We have implemented I-JVM in the LadyVM virtual machine [15] which is
specification compliant with the JVM. Overall, I-JVM required the addition of
650 lines of code to LadyVM which are distributed as follows: Static variables, strings and java.lang.Class objects: 200 lines of code for
implementing the task class mirror in each class. The changes are done
at two levels: (i) in the Java class representation, wich contains the task
class mirror, (ii) in the bytecode translator to modify the accesses to static
variables and java.lang.Class objects to reference the task class mirror.
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each isolate method compiled by LadyVM. Resource accounting: 100 lines of code for accounting, for CPU, memory,
I/O and threads. Isolate per bundle: 50 lines of code to create and attach a new isolate to
a class loader when the latter first loads a class. Isolate termination: 150 lines of code for the termination of isolates.
These numbers are quite low and show that implementing I-JVM within a
legacy JVM should be quite easy.
While we rely on the Java language for memory protection between bundles,
we changed the equality feature of strings in the JVM for the purpose of isolation
between bundles. The Java language assumes that strings in class files are
hashed. In I-JVM, each bundle has its map of strings, therefore the == operator
does not work for strings allocated by different bundles. Programmers should
use the equals function instead. The issue is also raised in KaffeOS [5].
4 Evaluation
In this section, we first motivate the need for fast inter-bundle calls in OSGi by
benchmarking a simple OSGi application. Then, we evaluate I-JVM, in terms of
performance and memory overhead, and in terms of robustness against attacks.
Finally, we discuss the limitations of our resource accounting scheme.
4.1 Inter-bundle Calls
To motivate the approach of OSGi and the need for fast inter-bundle calls,
we evaluated the application demo provided by Felix [1]. The application is
a paint program architectured with bundles. The drawing area, as well as the
shapes that can be drawn are implemented as bundles. The user can add shapes
dynamically or remove them through the OSGi bundle manager.
We measured the number of inter-bundle calls when I-JVM executes the
application. Each time a shape is dragged on the drawing area, an inter-bundle
call happens between the drawing area and the shape. When the user moves
the shape in the drawing area, dragging and moving the shape from upper-left
to the bottom-right makes roughly two hundred inter-bundle calls. Table 1
shows the time for performing two hundred inter-bundle calls depending on the
communication implementation. We evaluate four kinds of implementations: (i)
local call, (ii) RMI call, which is the standard inter-application communication
in Java, (iii) Incommunicado [25], the communication model of Isolates, and
(iv) I-JVM. I-JVM is an order of magnitude faster than other approaches for
inter-isolate communication.
4.2 Performance Overhead of I-JVM
Since LadyVM has been designed for easing experimenting with virtual ma-
chines, it does not compete with industrial JVMs. We thus report our ex-
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Local method RMI local call Incommunicado I-JVM
Time 20µs 90ms 9ms 24µs
Table 1: Cost of 200 inter-bundle calls, depending on the communication model.
The benchmarks were measured on a Pentium D 3.0GHz with 3GB of memory.
Incommunicado is reported to be ten times faster than RMI [25].
Figure 1: Performance of I-JVM for the micro-benchmarks, relative to LadyVM.
periments in terms of relative performance and memory overheads of I-JVM
compared to LadyVM.
All experiments were done on a Pentium D 3.0GHz with 3GB of memory
running Mandriva Linux 2.6.23.
To evaluate the overhead of isolation and resource accounting in I-JVM,
we have run the following set of micro-benchmarks: intra-isolate and inter-
isolate calls, object allocation and access to static variables. We measured
the overhead performing the same operation a million times. We also ran the
SPEC JVM98 benchmark in an isolate to measure the overall runtime cost of
I-JVM. Finally, we evaluated the memory overhead induced by running two
legacy implementations of OSGi, Felix [1] and Equinox [2] on top of I-JVM.
Figure 1 shows the relative performance of I-JVM compared to LadyVM for
the micro-benchmarks. I-JVM adds two test instructions when executing an
intra-isolate method call. For an inter-isolate call, it also updates the current
isolate of the thread, thus adding four more store operations. Overall, an intra-
bundle call induces a 14% overhead and an inter-bundle call induces a 16%
overhead.
We also benchmarked the performance of object allocation by repetitively
allocating a java.lang.Object object. In LadyVM and I-JVM, the size of such an
object is 28 bytes. The results show that there is an 18% overhead compared
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Figure 2: Overhead of I-JVM for the Spec JVM98 benchmarks, relative to
LadyVM.
to LadyVM, due to resource accounting, testing the memory limit when an iso-
late allocates an object and the intra-bundle cost of calling the java.lang.Object
constructor. Finally, we measured static variable access. We removed all com-
pilation optimizations in I-JVM to exhibit the cost of one access to the static
variable. The benchmark shows that accessing a static variable gives a 46%
overhead penalty on I-JVM. This is due to the task class mirror requiring two
loads more than a simple load of a static variable plus an initialization check to
verify that the static variable has been allocated. When I-JVM runs with all
compilation optimizations, the overhead of accessing a static variable a million
times is below 1% because the extra instructions execute only once.
We measured the execution time of SPEC JVM98 benchmarks [4] running
within Isolate0, so as to evaluate the overhead of I-JVM for standard Java
programs. Figure 2 shows that the overhead of I-JVM is below 20% for all
benchmarks. By comparison with MVM that reports a maximum overhead of
10% [10], I-JVM is less efficient. The main reason is that I-JVM induces an
overhead for resource accounting and the test during intra-isolate calls. How-
ever, the cost of inter-isolate communication in MVM is an order of magnitude
higher than a simple method call [25].
Finally, we measured the memory overhead induced by I-JVM when running
an OSGi implementation. There are two places where I-JVM requires more
memory than a standard JVM: (i) the array of task class mirrors for each class
and (ii) a per-isolate set of strings and statistics information. Figure 3 shows
the memory used when running the base configurations of Felix and Equinox.
Felix runs the OSGi runtime and three management bundles (administration,
shell, repository). Equinox runs the OSGi runtime and twenty-two management
bundles. Overall, the memory overhead for both OSGi implementations is below
16%.
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Figure 3: Memory consumption of I-JVM and LadyVM on OSGi implementa-
tions.
4.3 Robustness Evaluation
In Section 2, we presented a set of attacks to measure the robustness of JVM
implementations running an OSGi platform. In this section, we compare the
result of executing these attacks on I-JVM and on the Sun JVM. I-JVM prevents
the eight kinds of attacks by relying on an administrator. With the Sun JVM,
the administrator loses control of the platform and has no possibility of stopping
the execution of bundles, even if he detects the offending bundles. With the Sun
JVM, the platform freezes or aborts under denial of service attacks.
A1 - Store mutable object in static variable. Bundle A defines an array
as a static variable and works on the elements of the array. Bundle B finds the
static variable either at compile-time, or at runtime through the reflection B. B
sets to null the contents of the array.
Result with Sun JVM: Bundle A throws a NullPointerException.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM isolates bundles so that they cannot access another
bundle’s static variables. The array is duplicated, therefore the modifications
made by bundle B are local to bundle B. Bundle A continues to work on the
array.
A2 - Synchronized method or synchronized call block. Bundle A calls a
static synchronize method defined in a class that belongs to the bundle. Bundle
A therefore synchronizes on the java.lang.Class object of the class. Another
bundle B explicitly synchronizes on the object, holding the object forever.
Result with Sun JVM: Bundle A is blocked.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM disallows the sharing of strings, java.lang.Class
objects and static variables, therefore there is no interference between bundles
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that do not communicate with each other. Therefore, bundle A continues to
run.
A3 - Memory exhaustion : A set of bundles are running on the platform.
The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that allocates many objects
and stores them in an array, thus preventing the GC from deallocating the
objects.
Result with Sun JVM: All bundles get a OutOfMemoryError when allocating
a new object.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the memory used by each bundle. Based
on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all other
bundles continue to run.
A4 - Exponential object creation. A set of bundles are running on the
platform. The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that allocates
many objects but does not keep a reference to them, thus triggering the GC
many times.
Result with Sun JVM: The JVM spends its time garbage collecting. The non-
offending bundles make progess slowly.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the number of times a bundle runs a GC.
Based on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all
other bundles continue to run.
A5 - Recursive thread creation. A set of bundles are running on the plat-
form. The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that endlessly creates
threads.
Result with Sun JVM: All bundles get a OutOfMemoryError when allocating
a new object or a new thread.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the number of threads a bundle creates.
Based on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all
other bundles continue to run.
A6 - Standalone infinite loop. A set of bundles are running on the platform.
The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that runs an infinite loop.
Result with Sun JVM: The non-malicious bundles make progress slowly.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the CPU usage of each bundle. Based
on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all other
bundles continue to run.
A7 - Hanging thread. Bundle A calls a method of bundle B and bundle B
calls Thread.sleep(0).
Result with Sun JVM: Execution never returns to bundle A.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM inspects the current bundle of each thread and
counts the number of sleeping threads in a bundle. Based on this information,
the administrator kills the bundle that called Thread.sleep. If bundle A was pre-
pared to catch the StoppedIsolateException, execution returns to A. Otherwise,
the exception is caught at a lower stack level.
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A8 - Lack of termination support. Bundle A calls bundle B and is waiting
for an object value. Bundle B returns an object that points to the internal
representation of bundle B in the OSGi platform. Bundle A stores the reference
in one of its variable. Bundle B then makes a denial of service attack. Therefore,
the administrator tries to unload bundle B.
Result with Sun JVM: The OSGi platform is unable to unload the bundle, and
the attack continues to run.
Result with I-JVM: All threads that execute code from bundle B throw an
exception and execution never returns to bundle B.
4.4 Automatic Denial of Service Attacks Detection
We have shown that the resource accounting in I-JVM allows an administrator
to locate misbehaving bundles. However CPU time, the number of collection
activations and the amount of memory cannot in the current design be used to
automatically kill these bundles. The following experiments show the limits of
our approach:
1. CPU time. A malicious bundle M calls a function of another bundle A
a million times. Since I-JVM regularly samples the current isolate of a
thread, it randomly charges the CPU to the caller or the callee. At the end
of the experiment, I-JVM charged roughly 75% of the CPU to A and 25%
to M. Since the callee updates the current isolate, it executes more code
than the caller, which explains the CPU distribution of our experiment.
2. Garbage collection. We changed the function implemented in A to allocate
and return a new object. Since, M is calling A a million times, a garbage
collection is triggered on behalf of A.
3. Memory accounting. Now bundle M implements a function that returns a
large object (100M). The bundle is supposed to implement a well-defined
interface (in our experiment a dictionary service) and is called by other
bundles. When a garbage collection happens, the garbage collector does
not charge the large objects to M but to the callers of M.
These examples show that our resource accounting is not as precise as
process-based resource accounting. However, resource accounting in the pres-
ence of object sharing and thread migration requires a trade-off between precise-
ness and efficiency. We leave as future work improvements on better resource
accounting.
5 Related Work
Our approach combines ideas from different research areas. In this section,
we report how our work relates to (i) operating system structure for resource
management and communications and (ii) resource accounting and isolation in
JVMs.
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5.1 Operating Systems
Resource management and isolation are usually the responsibility of operating
systems. The process abstraction is the means of isolation and resource account-
ing. One can set resource limits for a process and for its children. Processes
communicate with each other and with the kernel through system calls and
arguments are copied between user space and kernel space.
Micro-kernel operating systems differ from monolithic operating systems by
placing the various modules of a kernel in different protection domains. Each
module has its own page table and does not see other modules (except the kernel
itself). The kernel and modules communicate through Inter-Process Commu-
nication (IPC) primitives. Micro-kernels require fast IPCs between processes
in order to acheive competitive performance compared to monolithic kernels.
Techniques like LRPC [7], thread migration [14] and continuations [12] reduce
the cost of IPCs by using the same thread: they jump directly between the
caller and the callee without involving the scheduler. Also, projects like L4 [23]
achieve a high level of IPC performance by fine tuning IPCs with hardware
techniques.
Single address space operating systems like Opal [9] and Mungi [19] share
one global virtual address space among processes. But each process can only ac-
cess its own memory thanks to memory protection, hence parameters are copied
from the caller to the callee. Other single address space operating systems such
as Spin [8], JX [16], JavaOS [29], or Singularity [20] base their protection on the
type-safety of the language. However all these operating systems enforce isola-
tion by avoiding direct procedure calls and by using IPCs through shared heaps
or portals. Both cases break compatibility with existing OSGi applications.
The Scout operating system [30], Rialto [21], and resource containers [6]
introduce new approaches for resource accounting in operating systems. Threads
in these systems are not bound to a protection domain but migrate between
protection domains while charging resources to a single resource management
entity. These systems differentiate users and protection domains. In OSGi a
protection domain (ie a bundle) is a user. Moreover, a protection domain switch
has the same cost than a standard IPC.
5.2 Isolation in Java Virtual Machines
The standard isolation mechanism in current JVMs is based on class loaders
[22]. Class loaders provide name space isolation, i.e. there is no collision be-
tween classes with the same name but loaded by two different class loaders.
Class loaders have weak isolation guarantees, as they still share static variables,
interned strings and java.lang.Class objects.
There are many projects that attempt to give operating system features to
the JVM. The J-Kernel [18] provides multiple protection domains in Java in
which domains communicate through capabilities, which have similar costs to
regular IPCs. Its sister project, JRes [11] adds resource accounting in the Java
platform on a per process basis. KaffeOS [5] is an extended JVM that executes
multiple applications in the same virtual machine. Applications communicate
through the use of a shared heap which prevents references to local heaps. The
Multi-Tasking Virtual Machine (MVM) [10] is also an extended JVM that exe-
cutes multiple applications, but without a shared heap. Isolate communication
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in MVM is implemented with Links or Incommunicado [25] which are an order of
magniture less efficient than simple method calls. While the J-Kernel, KaffeOS
and MVM provide safe isolate termination, they rely on expensive inter-isolate
communications.
OSGi uses Java permissions to enhance security and limit the rights of a
bundle. When a method wants to know the protection level of its caller, the
JVM inspects the stack trace to find which class loader loaded the class of
the caller. A class loader can be given a security policy, which indicates what
kind of privileged operations the classes loaded by this class loader can perform.
Inspection of a stack is an expensive operation, which would dramatically reduce
the performance of our approach if it were performed on each access to a static
variable, string or java.lang.Class.
6 Conclusion
We have described the design and implementation of I-JVM, a Java Virtual
Machine extended with component isolation and termination in OSGi. I-JVM
enables a lightweight isolation of OSGi bundles while still providing fast commu-
nication through thread migration across bundles and direct sharing of objects.
The isolate architecture of I-JVM allows a per-bundle resource accounting that
an administrator can use to terminate a misbehaving bundle. Even though iso-
lation and resource accounting has a small overhead compared to a regular JVM,
our evaluation shows that I-JVM is able to inform denial of service attacks to
an administrator and stop their execution.
In this paper, we considered resource accounting as an assistance for an
administrator to locate possible resource problems and kill the bundles he thinks
are malicious. We plan as future work to improve the preciseness of resource
usage. Still, we believe that the bundle isolation and termination features of
I-JVM are essential features for the management of current and future OSGi
platforms.
7 Availability
I-JVM is publicly available via an open-source license at the URL:
http://vmkit.llvm.org
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